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Comments
THE KENTUCKY CONSUMER ACT-TRUE HAPPINESS?
An Epilogue
If we adhere to a strict interpretation of the received economic
theory, there would seem to be no necessity for consumer protec-
tion. The consumer, in the legends that pass as theory, is a
calculating individual who knows what he wants and how he can
get it. Producers are forced to respond to the consumer's demands
in order to survive in what is held to be a fiercely competitive strug-
gle for the consumer's dollar. As a result of these general condi-
tions, producers are forced to deliver goods in just the quantity and
quality that consumers desire them.'
The above is not an excerpt from Alice in Wonderland, although
I am certain that were Lewis Carroll alive today he could find room
for it in his book. Such naivete may be humorous when read, but it
is no laughing matter when acted upon. Yet, this is the same foun-
dation used to construct the common law of consumer protection.
The law developed at a time when sellers hawked their wares in the
marketplaces of medieval England and variety was limited to a few
essentials with which the buyer was familiar. If a man sold cloth he
was in one section of the marketplace, if he sold fish he was (to the
cloth seller's relief) in another section of the market. The shopper
compared products side by side as each seller demonstrated the
qualities of his product. Alas, those were "the good old days." Today
the producer and the retailer are in most instances two separate
entities. The local marketplace is usually composed of large depart-
ment stores and chain-store food merchandisers who gather all the
purchaser's needs in one place and make a profit on whichever com-
peting product is purchased. The vendee, unlike his predecessor, is
faced with a plethora of different items from which to choose. He
can no longer distinguish the elements indicative of quality and has
come to assume that the best product is the one with the highest
price tag. In addition to these woes the patron finds that, while he
is almost always able to make the product perform, he rarely has the
know-how to repair the inevitable breakdown, and-to his chagrin-
all too often neither does the vendor. These changes have occurred in
the marketplace while too many of the common law aspects of con-
sumer protection have remained in a medieval state. Seeds sown in
1 D. HAzm.ToN, CONSUlMER PROTECTION IN NEw MExico 1 (1971).
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the dark ages wilt in the light of reason, and it was inevitable that
someone would cry out:
It must not be; there is no power...
Can alter a decree established.
'Twill be recorded for a precedent,
And many an error by the same example
Will rush into the state. It cannot be.
2
In the decade since President Kennedy presented his consumer
message to Congress,3 an awareness of the consumer's plight has
permeated all levels of our society. Every area of the news media
has contributed to an awakening of interest in consumer problems,
and a substantial body of literature has developed on the subject. The
brittle encrustations of an anachronistic common law have neces-
sitated sweeping legislative action.4 The United States Congress has
been in the vanguard of this consumer protection movement,5 but the
complementary efforts of state legislatures have shown such marked
increase 6 that they may soon eclipse the federal record. In the 1972
Session of the General Assembly, Kentucky took what some would
consider a giant step 7 toward providing a means of combating
egregious business practices8 which bilk the unsuspecting consumer.
Embodied in this new structure is the Division of Consumer Protection
of the Department of Law and an adequate legal foundation from
which consumer protection action can be launched. We shall consider
two principal questions: What protection is afforded the Kentucky
consumer under Senate Bill 52 and how can he avail himself of these
rights? How does his situation compare with that of consumers in
other states and how can it be improved?9
The passage of the new Consumer Protection Act 0 puts the Ken-
tucky purchaser in a more favorable position than that of his counter-
parts in a major portion of the nation." Although eleven states still
2 W. SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE, Act IV, Scene 1, lines 218-22.
3 H.R. Doc. 364, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
4E. KINTNER, A Panvmi ON THE LAw OF DECEPTIVE PRACTICES: A GUIDE FOR
THE BUSINESSMAN 5-14 (1971).
5 Id. at 15-21.
0 KENTUCKY LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMM'N, CONSUMER PROTECTION AGEN-
ciEs: A SuRvEY 24-42 (1969); THE CouNc. OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, CONSutmr
PROTECTION IN THE STATES 23-25 (1970).
7 Note, Can the Kentucky Consumer Ever Forget Caveat Emptor and Find
True Happiness? 58 KY. L.J. 325, 379 (1970).
8 Ky. REv. STAT. ch. 367 (Supp. 1972) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
9 See Note, supra note 7, for material on consumer laws in Kentucky prior to
the enactment of Kentucky's Consumer Protection Act.
10 KRS ch. 367.
11 NAT'L ASS'N OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL COMM. ON THE OFFICE OF ArronNry
GENERAL AND CONSUMER PROTECTION COMM., STATE PROGRAMS FOR CONSUTER
PROTECTION 74 (Aug. 1972) [hereinafter cited as COMMITTEE].
[Vol. 61
CoM2nmIrs
have no comparable legislation,'2 the remaining states have either the
Consumer Fraud, Deceptive Trade Practices or "Little F.T.C." form
of Consumer Protection Act.13 The "Little F.T.C." pattern is designed
to prevent those "unfair methods of competition and unfair or de-
ceptive acts or practices" which are prohibited in interstate commerce
by the Federal Trade Commission; it is the approach favored by the
F.T.C.14 This format is followed in nine states.15 Fourteen states
have enacted the type of legislation Kentucky has adopted.16 The
third form-a deceptive trade practices act-proscribes certain enu-
merated practices. 17 Sixteen states take this approach.' 8
Regardless of the form chosen, the overwhelming majority of states
have their laws structured so that primary responsibility for enforce-
ment is in the hands of the Attorney General, 19 and in this respect
Kentucky is no exception.20 There is strong feeling that this is the
most effective method of implementing this type of law.2 ' The fact
that the Attorney General's Office is an already existing administrative
body normally performing similar functions cogently supports this
proposition. However, enacting a consumer protection law and en-
trusting its enforcement to the appropriate administrative body is no
panacea. There must be adequate budgetary allotments for the
necessary personnel and material resources which will insure sufficient
implementation. In this respect numerous states, including Kentucky,
have exercised a frugality which may prove uneconomical in the long
run.2 2 The entire Kentucky Consumer Protection Division consists
of an Assistant Deputy Attorney General, two other attorneys, one
Education Specialist, one full-time and one part-time clerk and four
secretaries.23  It is indeed fortunate that the majority of Kentucky's
businessmen are honest!
A small number of states initiate enforcement actions on their own,
121d.
13 Id.
14Id. at 75; FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, UNFAIR TRADE PRAcTIcES AND CON-
SUMER PnOTEC'roN LAw 1 (Rev. 1970) [hereinafter cited as COrMISSION].
15 CoMmitTEE, supra note 11, at 75-76.
16 Id. at 76; Co znssioN, supra note 14, at 1.
17 COiqfArr, supra note 11, at 76-77; CoZLnssION, supra note 14, at 2.
For a discussion of some of the results in a state following this model see ThE
JoiNT SENATE-HoUsE COMMWTTEE, CONSUMER PROTECnON LN FLORIDA (1970).
For criticism of this approach see Note, supra note 7, at 354-55.
IS COMfMrE, supra note 11, at 77.
19 Id. at 4-7.
20 KlS § 367.150.
21 Co NMlE, supra note 11 at 13-16; Note, supra note 7, at 333-36.
22 CoMMIrTEE, supra note 11, at 17.
23 Interview with Robert V. Bullock, Assistant Deputy Attorney General,
Chief of the Kentucky Consumer Protection Division, in Frankfort, October 4, 1972
[hereinafter cited as Interview].
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but the usual practice is for the state's consumer protection agency to
use consumer complaints as a source upon which to predicate action.
24
Since Kentucky has no full-time investigator on its staff, 5 it would
appear to be relegated to the latter class. The natural corollary of
depending upon laymen as the primary source of information is that
the vast majority of complaints are merely instances of misunder-
standing between the consumer and the merchant.26 These are cir-
cumstances at which consumer protection laws are not aimed, and
the best assistance the Attorney Generals Office can furnish is that
of a mediating agency.27 Complaints stemming from a misunderstand-
ing can never be lightly regarded because, should the complainant
feel that he has not received proper consideration, he may become
discouraged and refrain from reporting future incidents which involve
actual violations.
The large number of complaints received by state consumer pro-
tection agencies forces them to establish priorities. These priorities
vary from state to state, but in general they tend to encompass: 1) the
number of consumers affected; 2) the amount of money involved; 3)
the degree of deception or fraud being practiced; and 4) the likelihood
of successful action.28 Aside from enforcement action, the Kentucky
Division for Consumer Protection has other functions to perform and
the order of importance of such functions is considered to be: first,
bring actions for consumer fraud; second, represent consumers before
rate-making agencies; third, conduct consumer education projects; and
finally, deal with consumer-business misunderstandings. 2 The specific
action taken within each category on a state's priority list is also an
important aspect of the overall program. Among the various states
there are divergent philosophies as to the principal desired result of
departmental action. One school of thought sees the main objective as
the procurement of refunds to the consumer where there are deceptive
practices. A second group contends that the consumer protection
division is more an agency for the prevention of deceptive practices
than for obtaining restitution.30 The prophylactic effect of the latter
philosophy seems especially amenable to situations where the staff
is overburdened. When this philosophy is weighed in conjunction
with the ability of a private party in Kentucky (though not in most
24 COMMrrrEE, supra note 11, at 30.
25 Interview, supra note 23.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 CoMMrEE, supra note 11, at 41-42.
29 Interview, supra note 23.
30 CoMMirr-rEE, supra note 11, at 44.
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states31) to proceed on his own behalf and as a prevailing party to
collect attorney's fees,32 then the preventive philosophy has sub-
stanial merit.33 Of course, from a public relations point of view, con-
sumers will think they are receiving greater benefit from the law
when they are able to obtain restitution merely by picking up the
telephone and dialing the Attorney Generalrs Office. This is an area
in which consumer education can be effective. Educators can make
the public aware that they are being protected, but budget realities
dictate that they not be spoon-fed. It is unfortunate that we have not
reached the level of affluence where such self-contained action can be
initiated by the Attorney General (whether it will ever be feasible
may be debated) but until that time the public will be better pro-
tected if they are left to implement final recovery.
34
There are both short-term and long-term goals to be achieved
under consumer protection laws. Legal devices are used to combat
present emergencies while education aims at long-term prevention.
The ignorant and unsuspecting are prime candidates for the crafty
swindler. Educating such people is a lengthy process because more
than superficial knowledge is needed to keep up with new practices
and variations on old schemes. Consequently, stop-gap legal remedies
will be the predominant insulation for consumers until education can
produce more discerning shoppers.
Kentucky's Consumer Protection Law
An analysis of the new Kentucky Consumer Protection Law35 will
now be undertaken. The initial portions of the bill" formulate a
structure to be used for solving consumer problems. The bulk of the
duties and responsibilities are delegated to the Attorney Generals
Office. 37 This organizational segment of the Act is followed by legisla-
tion modeled after the consumer protection law designed by the
Federal Trade Commission 3s and recommended by the Committee on
Suggested State Legislation of the Council of State Governments. 9
3' Id. at 86.
32KRS § 367.220.
33 The position of the consumer in private action suits has certain disad-
vantages which wil be discussed later. Because of these drawbacks, the argument
presented here is somewhat weakened.
34 Note the caveat in the preceding footnote.
.15 KRS §§ 367.110-.990.
36 KRS §§ 367.110-.160.
37 See COMMrr=E., supra note 11, at 13-16, for the presentation of arguments
justifying such a structure.
38 CO NMSSxON, supra note 14.
3 0 THE CouNcm. OF STATE GovEnNmENTs, CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE
STATES appendix (1970).
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Section 7 of the Act4° makes "[f]alse, misleading, or deceptive acts
or practices in the conduct of trade or commerce" unlawful; "trade
[and] commerce [previously having been defined as] advertising,
offering for sale, or distribution of any services and any property,
tangible or intangible, real, personal, or mixed, and any other article,
commodity, or thing of value, and [including] any trade or commerce
directly or indirectly affecting the people of" Kentucky.41 A pro-
hibition of this magnitude is necessary to insure proper flexibility in
the face of changing circumstances. 42 The prohibition is broader in
scope than that of a deceptive trade practice approach, but it does
not have the range of the 'little F.T.C." model. The Act expands upon
the prohibitive language of the statutes of a number of other states.43
It can be argued that the law cannot be used to reach conduct taking
place after the transaction.44 While the language could have been
more exact in this respect,45 adoption of a strict judicial construction
would not be in keeping with the spirit of the Act. If it is not now
readily apparent, further reading will demonstrate that Section 7 is
the hub around which the Act revolves. The constricting doctrine of
caveat emptor no longer looms forebodingly in the path of recovery.
Excluded from the application of Section 7 is "the owner or pub-
lisher of newspapers, magazines or publications wherein such adver-
tisements appear, or... the owner or operator of a radio or television
station which disseminates such advertisements when the owner,
publisher or operator has no knowledge that such advertisement may
be in violation of Section 7. .. -"41 The fear had been expressed
previously that an exclusion thus worded might cause the media to be
less than diligent in screening advertisements in order to avoid acquir-
ing the requisite knowledge that would expose them to the Section 7
prohibitions.47 Experience thus far, while admittedly limited, allays
this fear.48  The various media have, if anything, increased their
vigilance. 49
40KRS § 367.170.
41 KRS § 367.110.
42 Dixon, Federal State Cooperation to Combat Unfair Trade Practices, 39
STATE GOV'T 37, 38 (1966); Note, Consumer Protection Under the Iowa Consumer
Fraud Act, 54 IowA L. REv. 319 (1968); CommVissioN, supra note 14, at 2.
43 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2513(a) (Supp. 1970), and the dis-
sension concerning the wording of that statute in Note, supra note 7, at 356.
44 Note, supra note 7, at 357.
451d. at 357, n.176.46KRS § 367.180.
47 Note, supra note 7, at 362.
48 Interview, supra note 23.
491d.
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Section 9 of the Act is the first of the remedial sections and provides
that the Attorney General may, whenever he
has reason to believe that any person is using, has used, or is
about to use any method, act or practice declared by [Section 7]
... unlawful, and that proceedings would be in the public interest
. . . immediately move in the name of the Commonwealth in a
circuit court for a restraining order or a permanent injunction to
prohibit the use of such method, act or practice50
This provision outlines the procedure to which the Attorney General
must adhere if he is to obtain a restraining order or an injunction. It
does not necessarily follow that a restraining order or injunction will
be forthcoming. The court will evaluate the evidence presented to
determine the likelihood that the action in question is a violation of
Section 7 and make its decision accordingly.51 If the court is satisfied
with the evidence, a restraining order or a temporary or permanent
50 KRS § 367.190.
G51Interestingly enough, this is one of the areas in which the statute received
its first constitutional test. In Commonwealth v. Clean W. Turner Enterprises, Inc.,
Civil No. 33822 (Fayette Cir. Ct., Aug. 2, 1972), the defendant argued that the
fact that the Kentucky Act is modeled after the F.T.C. Act which has been held
constitutional was not decisive.
[Tihe Federal Trade Commission Act is not applicable to the situa-
tion at hand. While its prohibition against "unfair or deceptive acts and
practices" is broader than that used in the Kentucky law, the Federal
Trade Commission Act is directed to sales in interstate commerce and
provides a far different means of enforcement. In an action under [that
act] a hearing is held in an appearance before an administrative board
based on a show cause order. Such is not the situation in the Kentucky
Consumer Protection Act. It is argued that this opportunity to be heard
before an administrative board prior to the granting of even a preliminary
injunction is what renders the Federal Trade Commission Act con-
stitutional and able to withstand assaults concerning its overbreadth.
Furthermore, Section 9 of the Act provides that if the Attorney Gen-
eral has reason to believe that any person is using what is defined as a
deceptive act or practice, he may initiate an action.... The foremost con-
stitutional denial is to be found in the Fourteenth Amendment in that
the Attorney General must present no proof in order to gain his re-
straining order for his temporary or permanent injunction. Id.
While the request for a restraining order is an ex parte proceeding, it is
highly questionable that this fact alone should make the act unconstitutional. Of
course if the situation were, as contended above, that the Attorney General could
obtain the restraining order without presenting any proof no doubt the statute
would be unconstitutional. The fact that the legislature did not specifically state
in the act that the circuit judge must weigh the evidence presented to determine
if the necessary proof has been made to issue the restraining order seems
immaterial. Is it not reasonable for the legislature to assume that the iudge will
carry out his normal judicial function without being told? If the legislature had
intended such an unusual procedure to be followed by the court then it should
have been expressed. The obvious reason no mention is made is that it was taken
for granted that the court would follow the normal procedure for issuance of a
restraining order in cases where first amendment rights might be affected. This
position is supported in Lovett, State Deceptive Trade Practice Legislation, 46 TurL.
L. REv. 724, 738-39 (1972).
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injunction will be issued against any further deceptive acts or practices
of the kind specified in the complaint.52 Once the restraining order
or injunction has been issued, the defendant becomes liable for any
violation of the court order.5 3 The penalty for each violation is not
more than twenty-five thousand dollars.5 4 This civil penalty is as
stringent as that in any other state and more severe than in the majority
of states.55
Although criminal penalties are not provided by most states, five
states do have such penalties.55 The imposition of criminal sanctions
has one important drawback; it may actually inhibit investigative and
enforcement efforts by increasing the burden of proof for the state.5r
Kentucky's civil penalty is an effective means of deterrence,
though it should be noted that continuing violators could be fined,
even if there were no specific penalty provision, by utilizing contempt
of court proceedings.5 8 The threat of contempt proceedings would be
enough to assure adherence to the order by responsible businesses,
but the more stringent penalty contained in the Act is necessary "to
deter and suppress misconduct by a hard core of ruthless, low-grade
entrepreneurs who refuse otherwise to conform with reasonable stan-
dards of fairness."59 In the more drastic cases and where there is the
likelihood of flight or concealment of assets that may destroy the power
of the court to grant proper relief, Sections 10 and 11 of the Act may
be applied.6 0 In accordance with these sections, a receiver may be
appointed to take possession of the violator's assets and distribute
them to the victims.61 The power to revoke a license or certificate
authorizing any person to engage in business in Kentucky also falls
into this category of extreme remedies.6
2
It is not entirely clear whether the Kentucky Act permits an ad-
52 KRS § 367.190(2). See Lovett, supra note 51, at 738-39.
53 KRS § 367.990(1).
54 Id.
55 Lovett, s-upra note 51, at 739. Two other states provide for fines up to
$25,000, one up to $15,000, eleven specify up to $10,000, two specify $5,000 and
four range from $2,500 to $5,000. Five states use criminal penalties, vith maximum
fines ranging from $250 to $10,000, and four of these states allow imprisonment
of up to one year.
5 6 Lovett, supra note 51, at 738 n.48.
57 Id.
58 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 432.280 (1971) [hereinafter cited as KRSAI.
59 Lovett, supra note 51, at 739.
60 KRS § 367.210.
61 Id. See also Lovett, supra note 51, at 739-40 wherein it is stated:
The legal opportunity for consumers to force receivership is analogous
to the opportunity of business creditors to initiate bankruptcy proceed-
ings for liquidated debts or to obtain attachments that tie up a debtor's
assets pending the settlement of unliquidated claims.6 2 KRS § 367.200.
[Vol. 61
C1] o Ts
ministrative right of action by the Attorney General to seek restitution
for victims. If the power exists, it is by implication.
(The court] may make such additional orders or judgements as may
be necessary to restore to any person in interest any moneys or
property, real or personal, which may have been acquired by means
of any practice declared to be unlawful ... including the appoint-
ment of a receiver.... 63
The direct approach would be to consider the Attorney General a
"person in interest." Hardly less direct would be appointment of the
Attorney General as a receiver, but it might be contended that this
provision should not apply except in the most extreme cases.
64
One administrative remedy that does not give cause for debate is the
voluntary compliance statute.8 5 At this juncture the law provides that
the Attorney General may accept an assurance of voluntary com-
pliance with respect to any method, act or practice deemed to be
violative of [the Act] from any person who has engaged or was
about to engage in such method, act or practice. Any such as-
surance shall be in writing and [properly filed]. Such assurance
• . . shall not be considered an admission of violation for any
purpose .... 66
This is a highly desirable provision and has been adopted by eighteen
other states.67 The advantage of this provision is two-fold. It saves
the investigative and litigation resources of the state, and it will satisfy
the majority of business firms that will be quite happy to comply. 8
An equally important remedy is contained in Section 12, 69 which
permits a private action to be brought and allows attorney's fees.
70
The initial impression is that the Kentucky policy is strong medicine
for consumer ills. Upon closer investigation and comparison with
other states that have similar statutes, the clause, unfortunately, be-
gins to resemble a placebo rather than an elixir. Of the thirteen other
states that have made provisions for private relief, only New Mexico
can be said to have given the consumer sandier footing on which to
stand.71 There are obvious overtones of business protection in this
03 KRS § 367.200; see Note, supra note 7, at 376.
64 Note, supra note 7, at 376-77; Lovett, supra note 51, at 740-41.
65 KRS § 367.230.
00 Id.
67 The eighteen states are Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Florida,
Kansas, Maine Michigan, Missouri, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Oregon, Penn-
sylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin.
0s Lovett, supra note 51, at 741; Note, supra note 7, at 372-73.
09 KRS § 367.220.
70 KRS § 367.220(3).
71 The states with better consumer policies in this area are Hawaii, Washing-
ton, South Carolina, North Carolina, California, Alaska, Idaho, Massachusetts,
Colorado, Indiana, Rhode Island, and Vermont.
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segment of the Kentucky Act. A detailed look at the laws of other
states best illustrates this point.
The consumer finds himself in the best position in Hawaii. There
the law provides for reasonable attorney's fees and costs to injured
parties with treble damages as the remedy, and it authorizes class
actions.72 Next on the list is Washington. That state has the same
provision except that it limits treble damages to the first $1,000, al-
lowing actual damages only beyond that level; it does not provide for
class action.73 South Carolina allows actual damages and attorney's
fees and costs but grants treble damages only where there is a case
of willful or knowing violation of the law.74 North Carolina permits
treble damages in all cases but has no automatic provision for attorney's
fees.7 5 California gives minimum damages of $300, actual damages if
they are greater and punitive damages at the court's discretion. It
also grants attorney's fees and specifically authorizes class actions."
Alaska and Idaho are similar; both provide for $200 minimum recovery
with attorney's fees allowed but not required.77 Massachusetts limits
recovery to actual damages, and attorney's fees are usually awarded
to a claimant who has not declined a reasonable settlement.
78 Colo-
rado law provides actual damages and, at the court's discretion,
attorney's fees.7 9 Vermont's recent law allows treble damages and
attorney's fees,8° where previously it had followed a policy similar to
that in Indiana and Rhode Island which allow damages but make no
provision for attorney's fees.8 ' From the consumer's standpoint Ken-
tucky would rank below all of these states in the area of private
action.
The portion at issue in Section 12 of the Act reads:
Any person [injured by acts declared unlawful under Section 7]
may bring an action [in accordance with the prescribed procedures
and in specified forums] to recover actual damages. The court
may, in its discretion, award actual damages and may provide
such equitable relief as it deems necessary or proper. Nothing in
72 HAw1A Rlv. STAT. § 480-13 (Supp. 1971).
73 
WASH. REv. CODE § 19.86.090 (Supp. 1971).
74 S.C. CODE ANN. § 66-71.13 (Supp. 1971).
75N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (Supp. 1971).76 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1780-81 (1973).
77ALAsA STAT. § 45.50.531 (Supp. 1971); IDAHO CODE § 46-608 (Supp.
1970).7 8 MAss. ANN. LAWs, ch. 93A, § 9(1), (2), (4) (Supp. 1971).
79 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 55-5-12 (Supp. 1969).80 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9 § 2461(b) (Supp. 1972).
81 IND. HOUSE Eimornxm Aar No. 1169, § 4 (1971); R.L GEN. LAWS ANN.
§ 6-13.1-1 (Supp. 1972).
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this subsection shall be construed to limit a person's right to seek
punitive damages where appropriate.
82
At this point, the Kentucky statute might be criticized for being unre-
sponsive in the area of recovery. There is certainly no strong incentive
to go into court. If the consumer wins there is no mandate that assures
recovery, and it is still not worthwhile to litigate over small amounts.
The last sentence merely preserves the common law right to punitive
damages. It is hardly an encouraging climate for litigation. The rub
is yet to come! It reads:
In any action brought by a person under this section, the court
may award, to the prevailing party, in addition to the relief pro-
vided in this section, reasonable attorney's fees and costs.
8 3
A provision designed to discourage frivolous suits? This stand lacks
one supporting leg. There is no incentive to bring spurious suits! The
policy dilemma presents itself vividly. On one side is a policy favoring
litigation by offering enticing rewards, while the antithetical policy
is intent on protecting business firms from harrassing suits.
The Kentucky law is framed in such a way that the court has
discretion in awarding actual damages.84 The legislative intention
appears to be that if the consumer used a product for a substantial
period of time he should not be allowed to recover fully, in every
situation, upon discovery of the deceptions5-a "what-you-did-not-
know-did-not-hurt-you" attitude. This would not seem to be a war-
ranted assumption. It is correct to maintain, from a compensatory
standpoint, that any usefulness derived from the product should be
allowed in mitigation of damages. This is elementary in the law of
remedies and should be considered in arriving at the final determination
of the actual damages! Why then should there be any discretion as
82 KRS § 367.220(1) (emphasis added).
83 KRS 367.220(3) (emphasis added).
Although the language, to the prevailing party" was inserted in this
section with the intent that the prevailing party to a particular suit,
whether consumer or merchant, might recover the wording is extremely
ambiguous. When "prevailing party" is read in conjunction with the
subsequent clause, "in addition to the relief provided in this section,"
it seems to imply that only prevailing parties who can receive "additional
relief' under this section can receive attorney's fees. Since the only "ad-
ditional relief' granted is to consumers, then the inference is that only
consumers can recover attorney's fees. Had the sentence read "the court
may award, to a prevailing party, in addition to the relief provided" then
it would strongly indicate such an interpretation. This contradiction
remains in the statute, hopefully to be seized upon by a court with a
consumer perspective.84KRS § 367.220(1).85 Interview, supra note 23.
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to the award of proven damages? This portion of the Act is additionally
weakened when the enigmatic policy implication is further scrutinized.
A law intended to protect the public from deceptive commercial prac-
tices should not-the deception having been proven-protect the per-
petrator of the deception. If anything, the statute should have a deter-
rent effect.
When the likely investigative expenses, costs, and risk involved
in consumer litigation, and the possibilities of flight by some de-
fendants are taken into account, consumers and their counsel
should be assured of something more than a chance at actual
damages as the end product of a private action.8 0
Without certain recovery of 1) reasonable attorney's fees, 2) costs of
the suit, 3) actual damages, and 4) in some cases punitive damages to
discourage misconduct or to offset unusual risks in litigation, the
bargaining power of consumers to obtain prompt settlements without
litigation is bleak. Furthermore, prospective profits from deceptive
practices are enhanced.8 7 The only situation in which the Kentucky
consumer is strongly motivated to bring an action is when the damage
sustained is large enough to render the risk of loss nugatory or when
the case is "open and shut."
What cases are likely to arise? Many involve fraud against the
aged and the ignorant (consequently in most cases, the poor). Here the
practices are usually the severe, fraudulent and deceptive types, which
would give the plantiff a much stronger case in court. On the other
hand, the amount involved generally is small. The potential plaintiff
is in a precarious financial condition to begin with and the fraud has
further weakened that position. The choice that must be made is
whether to forego legal action with the hope of surviving the crisis or
to risk utter ruination in court. Even the smallest chance of losing
may dissuade a party not totally confident of the legal system when
the stakes are so high. A completely different situation is likely to
arise when more informed and financially stable persons are the victims.
Because this group is harder to defraud, rather ingenious traps are
required. Many of these traps are in the grey zone of deceptive
practices. Even though the financial loss may be substantial the need
for qualitative and quantitative evidence increases costs and fees and
proportionately decreases the inclination to bring suit. These examples
do not exhaust all the possibilities that may arise but they do demon-
strate the effect of the policy.
A suggested solution to the dilemma would be to incorporate some
86 Lovett, supra note 51, at 747.
87 Id. at 747-48.
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elements of punitive damages, thereby offsetting litigative risks and
allowing conservative estimates of actual damages to be applied
routinely. The cost of marshaling evidence as to the precise amount
of damage would be reduced under this plan.s8 Drawing upon
existing state remedies, this approach would favor double or treble
damages. Thus Kentucky might adopt a remedy resembling that of
the Washington statute.89 If Kentucky still desires to cling to the dis-
suasive policy embodied in Section 2(8) of the present law then it
should further enhance the consumer's position to provide necessary
incentive for legitimate suits. Adoption of the type of recovery provided
for in Hawaii,90 with no limit on treble damages, would serve to
balance the scales. This combination would assure a rightful claimant
a reasonable chance for full recovery as well as incentive for time and
effort. The honest businessman would also benefit by avoiding any
financial burden from irresponsible plaintiffs.
Not every deserving consumer would prevail, since plaintiffs would
continue to bear their basic burden of proof, which would be dif-
ficult in cases of marginal claims and conflicting testimony. But
wronged consumers could certainly bargain with greater leverage
to obtain fair and reasonable treatment under this regime .... 91
In order that the reader not lose his perspective while viewing
this grim picture of the private litigation provision in Kentucky, it
should be noted again that Kentucky is one of only fourteen states
that provide for any private action. The other states have bowed to
business protection policies in this respect.
Comment would not be complete on the subject of private action
without mentioning class action suits. Business malpractice that
"takes" the consumer for minor sums of money represents a huge
amount when aggregated.92 For this reason, the class action suit is
appealing. Under Rule 28 of the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure,
four criteria must be met in order to pursue a class action: first the
class must be so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable;
second, there must be questions of law or fact common to the class;
third, the representatives of the class must present claims or defenses
88 Lovett, Private Actions for Deceptive Trade Practices, 23 Ai. L. REV. 271,
283-90 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Private Actions].89 WsH. REv. CoDE; § 19.86.090 (Supp. 1972).
90 HAwAI REv. STAT. § 480-13(1) (Supp. 1972).
91 Lovett, supra note 51, at 749.
92 Newberg, Federal Consumer Class Action Legislation: Making the System
Work, 9 II.v. J. LE. 217, 219 (1972). See generally Baroni, The Class Action
As a Consumer Protection Device, 9 Am. Bus. L.J. 141 (1971); Jacobs, Impact of
Consumer Class Actions Upon Confessed Judgments, 88 BAN xNG L.J. 683 (1971);
Starrs, Continuing Complexities in the Consumer Class Action, 49 J. URBAN L.
349 (1971).
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which are typical of those of the entire class; and finally, the repre-
sentative parties must be ones that will fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class.0 3 At least one commentator thinks that this
limits the type of activity in which class actions can be maintained
to cases where there is a uniform advertising or sales routine that is
the predominant factor in the deception. 94 But such restriction does
not retain its severity when one considers that the major source of
fraud throughout the United States is large television advertisers 5
False advertising of soap, detergents, aspirin, bleach, and a half
dozen other major products on TV doubtless inflates prices to the
consuming public by more than all the retail frauds put together.
96
On the federal level, consumer class action suits have confronted a
major stumbling block which only Congress can remove. In Snyder v.
Harris97 the Supreme Court of the United States held that claims of
those similarly situated may not be aggregated to reach the $10,000
federal jurisdictional amount. There have been a number of bills
introduced in Congress9" that seek to circumvent this restriction to
some degree.99 This barricade is not present in the state courts, but
availability of the federal courts is certainly desirable since many of
the violators are not state residents.100 The issues evolving from the
debate over this topic are pertinent to the evaluation of class action
policies on both the state and federal level. The main arguments put
forth opposing class action suits are:
1. Legitimate businesses will be harrassed by unscrupulous law-
yers.
2. Unfounded suits increase operating costs resulting in in-
creased prices to the customer.
3. Consumer class actions will only be brought against well-
established corporations, with fly-by-night operators going free.
93 Ky. R. Civ. P. 23.01.94 Private Action, supra note 89, at 289.95 Foreword to 2 ANTrrRusT L. & ECON. REv. 1, at 14 (No. 4, 1969).
96 Id.
97 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
98 Eckhardt.Bayh Bill, H.R. 5630, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) (introduced
by Representative Eckhardt of Texas on March 4, 1971); S. 1378, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1971) (introduced by Senator Bayh of Indiana on March 24, 1971, as a
companion bill to H.R. 5630); Magnuson Bill, S. 984, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971)
(introduced by Senator Magnuson of Washington on February 25, 1971); Ad-
ministration's Bill, S. 1222, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) (introduced on March
12, 1971, on behalf of the Nixon Administration).
99 For a discussion of the bills referred to in note 98 see Newberg, supra note
92, at 236-59; Leete, The Right of Consumers to Bring Class Actions in the Federal
Courts-An Analysis of Possible Approaches, 33 U. Prrr. L. REv. 39, 42-52 (1971).
100 See note 92 and accompanying text.
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4. Existence of the threat of class action will stifle competitive
innovation.
5. Cost of administering recovery will exceed the size of the
claim.101
The underlying premise of Federal Rule 23 is to create a method
of redress for groups that otherwise could not obtain relief.10 2 The
policy of motivating lawyers to initiate class actions is "neither startling
nor new."10 3 The policy is present on the federal level in antitrust
situations, 10 4 under the Truth-in-Lending Act,' °5 in civil rights cases' 016
and under the securities acts. 07 The experience in these areas has not
indicated that the "flood of frivolous actions" argument has validity.
Under the federal rules and the Kentucky rules, there are safe-
guards that can be used to prevent harrassing suits. In accordance
with Rule 11, the attorney states that to the best of his knowledge,
information and belief there are good grounds for the action.'08 The
defendant can make use of the motion to dismiss,10 9 the motion for
summary judgment," 0 and the pre-trial conference"' as protective
devices. In the way of counter-offensive measures, the defendant has
at his disposal the weapons of action for malicious prosecution,
malicious service of process, and disbarment." 2 No doubt business
firms, if forced to do so, will forge new weapons in these areas.
When business advocates cry that harrassing litigation will increase
prices to the consumer, two rebuttals come to mind. In the first place,
large business frequently has a number of pending suits both as plain-
tiff and as defendant, and it has been argued that management has no
problem in treating them as a cost of doing business." 3 The further
insinuation that business can simply pass the brunt of the expense to
the consumer is, in reality, a threat aimed at undercutting support for
101 Newberg, supra note 92, at 221-34.
102 Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 497 (1969). See
also Ford, Federal Rule 23: A Device for Aiding the Small Claimant, 10 B.C. IND.
& Com. L. REv. 501 (1969). The Kentucky rules were taken verbatim from the
federal rules so these comments are applicable to the state as well.
103 Newberg, supra note 92, at 222.
104 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970). See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Re-
search, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969).
105 15 U.S.C. §§ 1640(a)(2) 1681(no) (1970).
106 Rolfe v. County Bd. of Educ., 391 F.2d 77, 81 (6th Cir. 1968).
107 Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 389-97 (1970).
108 Ky. R. Cir. P. 11; FED. R. Civ. P. 11. Unwarranted statements can be
dealt with by the bar.
10 9 Ky. R. Cirv. P. 12; FED. R. Civ. P. 12.
110 KY. R. CIv. P. 56; FED. R. Cn-. P. 56.
111 Ky. R. Civ. P. 16; FED. R. Crv. P. 16.
112 See generally Leete, supra note 99, at 52-56; Newberg, supra note 92, at
221-25.
113 Newberg, supra note 92, at 227.
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consumer protection actions." 4 It would not be wise to submit to
these heavy-handed tactics, for success may spawn similar maneuvers.
The third complaint, that class action suits will be brought dis-
criminatively and are therefore undesirable, lacks cogency. The argu-
ment that a substantial business operation which is violating the law
and benefiting from deceptive practices should not be prosecuted
because fly-by-night operations violate the same law but are inac-
cessible strikes a sardonic note.115 As previously stated, large business
firms receive the major portion of money deceptively obtained from
consumers. Why should they continue to enjoy the same inaccessi-
bility as small-time operators? In retort to grumblings that com-
petitive innovation will be stifled, the experience of financial institu-
tions under the Truth-in-Lending Act can be cited. These institutions
have satisfactorily conformed to the law without adverse results.116
It is the final issue, that of administrative cost, which has caused
faint hearts to abandon class action as an adequate remedy.11 7 But
"the consequences of not fashioning a remedy would permit avoidance
of appropriate sanctions and the retention of illegal profits. . ..-
"Relying on its own and counsers ingenuity" the court should be able
to create a viable solution. After all, this is one of the problems that
the class action suit was designed explicitly to overcome!" 9
As things now stand the Kentucky law will (whether intended or
not) deter a large majority of private consumer litigation and will
force the consumer to rely primarily on action by the Attorney Gen-
erars Office as the first line of defense against deceptive practices. If
this is to be the policy and the Division of Consumer Protection is
to be the Kentucky consumer's salvation, then the Division must be
heavily armed with staff and funds. Placing more power in the hands
of private individuals could lighten this burden tremendously.
The almost total reliance upon the Attorney General to carry out
the primary goals of the Act makes the powers granted to him par-
ticularly significant. Of special importance is the investigative power
placed in his hands. "Whenever [he] has reason to believe that a per-
son has engaged in, is engaging in, or is about to engage in any
114 Id.
"r5 Id. at 226.
116 Newberg, supra note 92, at 226. From address by Federal Trade Com-
missioner Mary Gardiner Jones, before the Baltimore Better Business Bureau.
1-7 Lovett, supra note 51, at 284.
" 8 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968), on remand
52 F.R.D. 253, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
119 Dole, Consumer Class Actions Under Recent Consumer Credit Legislation,
44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 80, 81 (1969).
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[violation] or when he believes it to be in the public interest that an
investigation should be made to ascertain whether" there is a violation,
he may envoke investigative powers.
120 These powers are extensive.1 2 1
The necessity for broad investigative powers is demonstrated by re-
flecting on the alternatives when such powers are withheld.
(1) [The Attorney General may then] cease pursuing those
schemes whose violation of the law is most difficult to prove,
thereby allowing even more citizens to be defrauded; (2) he can
bring court action with insufficient evidence and risk not only fail-
ing his burden of proof but also injuring the reputation of an in-
nocent corporation; (3) be can allow the fraudulent company to
continue to deceive and damage its customers while his staff
diligently pieces together the necessary proof from the victims
after they have been harmed; and (4) he can appropriate the
bulk of his budget to hiring investigators even though the money
120 KRS § 367.240. The remaining portion of the statute reads:
... a person in fact has engaged in, is engaging in or is about to engage
in, any act or practice declared to be unlawful by this Act, he may execute
in writing and cause to be served upon any person who is believed to
have information, documentary material or physical evidence relevant to
the alleged or suspected violation, an investigative demand requiring such
person to furnish, under oath or otherwise, a report in writing setting
forth the relevant facts and circumstances of which he has knowledge, or
to appear and testify or to produce relevant documentary material or
physical evidence for examination, at such reasonable time and place as
may be stated in the investigative demand, concerning the advertisement,sale or offering for sale of any goods or services or the conduct of anytrade or commerce that is the subject matter of the investigation. Pro-
vided however, that no person who has a place of business in Kentuckyshall he required to appear or present documentary material or physical
evidence outside of the county where he has his principal place ofbusiness ithin the Commonwealth.
(2) At any time before the return date specified in an investigative de-mand, or within twenty days after the demand has been served, which-
ever period is shorter, a petition to extend the return date, or to modify
or set aside the demand, stating good cause, may be fied in the circuit
court where the person served ith the demand resides or has his prin-
cipal place of business or in Franklin Circuit Court.
The two additinal statutes that are important in this area are KRS § 367.250,
which reads:
To accomplish the objectives and to carry out the duties prescribed by
this Act, the Attorney General, in addition to other powers conferredupon him in this Act, may issue subpoenas to any person, administer an
oath or affirmation to any person, or conduct hearings i aid of any
investigation or inquiry, provided that information obtained pursuant to
the powers conferred by the Act shall not be made public or disclosed
by the Attorney General or his employees beyond the extent necessary
for law enforcement purposes in the public interest.
and KRS § 367.260 which states:
Any person may apply to a circuit court for an appropriate order to
protect such person from any unreasonable investigative action taken




comes from the same people being defrauded by those under in-
vestigation, the public.122
Clearly, the approach adopted is superior to these alternatives. In
allowing the Attorney General to conduct the investigation through
an administrative proceeding, the legislature has given him a necessary
tool to explore potential areas of concern. Absent are the unnecessary
constrictions that would flow from the more formal approach of re-
quiring judicial mandates that call for evidence of probable cause.1
Yet, the legislature has not written a carte blanche. Any private party
affected by an administrative order can seek refuge in the courts.
124
Unreasonable investigation is not to be tolerated,' 2 5 so the business-
man need not worry that these powers enable the Attorney General to
conduct unrestrained harrassing examinations. There is also the as-
surance that "information obtained pursuant to the powers [in the Act]
shall not be made public or disclosed by the Attorney General . . .
beyond the extent necessary for law enforcement purposes in the
public interest." 2 6 It should be anticipated that the Attorney General
will meet with opposition on fifth amendment self-incrimination
grounds in numerous instances. A number of states have obviated
this problem by disqualifying use of information obtained pursuant
to the administrative procedure from any criminal prosecution of the
witness. 27 Without such a provision it is likely, especially in cases of
actual fraud, that fifth amendment protections would be invoked to
quash subpoenas.'28
If the Attorney General thinks there is danger that evidence may
be destroyed by a subpoenaed party, he will move in accordance with
Section 17(3) of the Act.' 29 Under this portion the Attorney General
may, whenever he has "probable cause" to believe that a person "has
engaged in, or is engaging in" any unlawful practice (within the scope
of the Act) and has "probable cause" to believe information will not
be obtainable pursuant to the administrative procedures, apply to the
circuit court ex parte for an order impounding the material evidence. 30
12 Note, supra note 7, at 365.
123 Id. at 367.
124 KRS § 367.260.
125 Id.
126 KRS § 367.250.
127 IOVA CODE § 713.24 (Supp. 1973).
128 Note, supra note 7, at 367.
129 KRS § 367.270(3).
130 This includes "any record, book, document, account, paper or sample of
merchandise which is material to the practice under investigation." KRS § 367.270.
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This drastic move is reserved for deceptive practices already con-
summated or presently in progress. The investigative measures pre-
viously discussed should be adequate to prevent deceptions still in
the planning stages from blossoming, so Section 17 action is not
needed in these cases. 3
1
Sanctions for failing or refusing to comply with administration in-
vestigative demands include injunctive relief and orders "[viacating,
annulling, or suspending the corporation charter" or certificate of
authority to do business in Kentucky as well as "revoking or suspending
any other licenses, permits or certificates issued pursuant to law to
such person which are used to further the allegedly unlawful practice,"
plus any "other relief as may be required," until the person obeys the
administrative demands. 182 However, before any final order is issued
against a person so charged, he is afforded an opportunity for a hear-
ing on the merits and, should he lose, disobedience will then be
punishable by contempt. 83 Additionally, fines of not less than $100
nor more than $5,000 may be imposed. 84 This sanction is relevant
when "any person with actual notice that an investigation has begun
or is about to begin . . . intentionally conceals, alters, destroys or
falsifies documentary material"i'15 or when any person "in response to
a subpoena or demand ... intentionally falsifies or withholds docu-
ments, records, or pertinent materials that are not privileged.... 36
Without the sting of this sanction the administrative proceedings would
be nugatory when dealing with the "hard-core" element.
The provision for service of process is in Section 18.137 It has been
criticized because it only provides for personal service rather than
more economical and expeditious types of service. 13 8 This section
gives ample consideration to "contact" problems however. Persons
outside the state who have engaged in conduct within Kentucky viola-
tive of the Act "shall be deemed to have thereby submitted themselves
to the jurisdiction of the courts of the commonwealth. . . ."19 There
can be no doubt that the legislature has vested the Attorney General
with full long-arm powers.
131 Its inclusion would no doubt raise the cry of "chilling effect" and the
additional aid it would give is not worth endangering the statute.
132 KRS § 367.290(1).
133 KRS § 367.290(2).
1
34 KRS § 367.990(3), (4).
135 KRS § 367.990(3).
130 KRS § 367.990(4).
13 7 KRS § 367.280.
138 Note, supra note 7, at 370.




Out of the disarray of the common law concept of caveat emptor
has come the realization that it is time for legislators to do what the
courts have failed to do: provide the modem day consumer with
protections that render the marketplace reliable and responsive to his
needs. The federal government has led the way in legislative action,
but recently states have begun to enact necessary consumer laws. At
present all but eleven states have some type of comprehensive legisla-
tion dealing with deceptive practices. The state laws are characterized
by certain common elements:
1. The bulk of the enforcement responsibility is in the Attorney
General's Office.
2. Consumer complaints are the major source used to discover
violations.
3. The volume of complaints relative to the staff available
obligates the states to set up a system of priorities.
4. Emphasis will be either on providing restitution or on pre-
venting deceptive practices.
The Kentucky Consumer Protection Act is a significant step for-
ward. It could, however, be improved in certain respects. A specific
statement which includes acts occurring after a transaction within the
provision of the statute would resolve possible ambiguity. The law
provides strong sanctions to augment action by the Attorney General,
and for this the General Assembly can be applauded. However, the
Act is sorely deficient in the area of private remedies. Not only is there
no encouragement for private suits, but there is actually a measure of
discouragement. If the private litigant wins, he will recover at most
only actual damages and attorney's fees. Should the private litigant
lose, he must pay both attorneys' fees. This seems clearly to evidence
a policy of almost total reliance upon the Attorney General's Office to
implement the Consumer Protection Act Following this policy will
require a larger staff and more funds than presently have been
allocated. In line with the heavy reliance on Attorney General en-
forcement, broad investigative powers have been delegated.
In summary, private action is essential to the successful curtailment
of business malpractice. At this juncture it is improbable that the
Attorney General will receive the funds or the staffing to meet im-
portant needs of the consumer. The proper safeguards for business
can be designed to alleviate the fear of injuring the economy or unduly
raising prices. We are on the road to an improved marketplace, but
the "invisible hand" of Adam Smith remains an anomaly.
Levi Daniel Boone, III
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